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LAWYERS AND LAWMAKING 
Frederick Schauer* 
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LA w. By Bruce A. Ackerman. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1984. Pp. x, 118. $10. 
I 
The law is a seamless web, so the old saw goes, but so too is life. 
Just as the categories and concepts of law are pervasively intercon-
nected, the categories with which we divide up the world are similarly 
conjoined. The demarcations that people use to organize their percep-
tions and their lives are not rigid and mutually exclusive, but rather 
constitute a set of overlapping and fuzzy-edged constructs, linked in 
such a way that changes in the pressure applied at any one point in 
society are likely to reverberate throughout much of the network that 
is our existence. 
What makes these interrelationships important to lawyers is that 
law itself is undeniably part of a larger whole. The seamless web of 
law is one component of the seamless web of life. And if the seamless 
web metaphor is indeed as apt for life as it is for law, then changes in 
any part of our social existence and organization are likely to be re-
flected not only in the content but also in the very nature of law. 
Like many other social constructs, therefore, law derives part of its 
definition from the character and definition of those constructs that 
surround it. 1 But this is not to say that the concept of law simply 
collapses into or reduces to those concepts surrounding it. If there 
were no sheep there would be no wool sweaters, and our demand for 
wool sweaters likely also affects the number of sheep in the world. Yet 
the inseparable closeness of the relationship between sheep and wool 
sweaters does not mean that there is no difference between a sheep and 
a wool sweater.2 And law, in similar fashion, can exist with its own 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1967, M.B.A. 1968, Dartmouth College; 
J.D. 1972, Harvard University. - Ed. 
1. Although I make this claim about the nature of definition solely in the context of certain 
social constructs, it has even been made about the character of definition and concept formation 
generally. In the jargon of philosophers, therefore, a change in the properties of some person or 
object under inspection solely as a result of changes in other people or objects or relations is a 
change of a special type, known as a "Cambridge change." See P. GEACH, LOGIC MA1TERS 
321-22 (1972). 
2. I find the example useful in thinking about the claims that law is politics. See, e.g., Kairys, 
Law and Politics, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 243, 248 (1984); Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, 
Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 391, 411 (1984). 
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useful separate identity3 even while it remains constantly influenced by 
and totally dependent on many other facets of social organization. 
Law is thus a culturally and temporally contingent part of a cul-
turally and temporally contingent world. But part of what gives law 
its useful separate identity is the way it performs a blocking function. 
Legal norms block, or impede, the consideration of certain subjects, 
arguments, or facts.4 The effect of a legal norm is such that certain 
factors that might otherwise be relevant are precluded from consider-
ation within the realm of discourse governed by the legal norm. 5 
Legal observations of the world, like other observations of the world, 
are theory-laden,6 and thus the "facts of the case" are those, and only 
those, that some legal theory has determined to be legally relevant. 
The consequence of this is that there may be many extant facts, princi-
ples, and arguments that remain unadmitted to the realm of what is 
noticed and considered by the law. 
Once we understand, however, that law's place in the world and 
law's definition are but one comer of a constantly fluid social system, 
we can appreciate that what law at one time blocks from legal consid-
eration might at another time be legally relevant. What is included in 
and what is excluded from legal consideration is one of the shifting 
seams between law and life, and thus large-scale societal changes may 
cause some facts or some reasons or some arguments to be included 
within the realm of legal discourse or legal power although they had 
previously been excluded. 
Focusing on this particular seam is Bruce Ackerman's agenda in 
Reconstructing American Law. The main theme of the book is that 
law in contemporary America has shifted in such a way that areas of 
inquiry not previously open for legal consideration are now becoming 
a standard part of the lawyer's argumentative arsenal. The lawyer 
who fails to recongize this shift in the nature of law and adapt to it 
3. "Useful separate identity" is a bit of a mouthful, but I can think of no better term to refer 
to a concept that does not collapse into others to which it is related. 
4. This, of course, is a large part of what the Realists and their progeny are so concerned 
with denying. But note that a claim that the law blocks or impedes consideration of certain 
matters is only a claim that the consideration of those matters is more difficult than it would have 
been had the block or impediment not been in place. The impediments of the law are therefore 
best viewed as presumptive rather than absolute. When the effect of law and doctrine is so char-
acterized, many of the assaults of Realism are largely beside the point. See generally Schauer, 
Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985); Schauer, Does Doctrine Matter? (Book Review), 82 
MICH. L. REV. 655 (1984). 
5. A good recent example of this phenomenon is Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984), in 
which a unanimous Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause prohibited community 
reaction to an interracial marriage as a permissible consideration in a child custody 
determination. 
6. I borrow the concept of theory-laden observation from the philosophy of science. See P. 
ACHINSTEIN, CONCEPTS OF SCIENCE 182-201 (1968); M. HESSE, REVOLUTIONS AND RECON· 
SfRUCTIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 63-73 (1980); K. POPPER, UNENDED QUEST 52 
(1976) ("There is no such thing as a perception except in the context of interests and expecta-
tions ..•• "). 
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accordingly is thus, according to Ackerman, running a serious risk of 
extinction. 
Ackerman makes his case by drawing a distinction between the 
reactive state and the activist state (pp. 1-5, 23-37). In the reactive 
state the prevailing norms and political structures are comparatively 
stable, and thus government is charged primarily with making sure 
that things keep working as they have been. But in the activist state 
few things are taken as "inexorable givens" (p. 2). Rather, significant 
and perhaps all parts of social organization are constantly subject to 
change and adjustment by the "self-conscious decisions made by polit-
ically accountable state officials" (p. 1). At least since the New Deal,7 
the United States has been the prototypical activist state. 
Having drawn this distinction between reactive states with their 
relatively stable political presuppositions and activist states without 
them, Ackerman builds on it another distinction that is central to the 
book's message. This distinction, clearly derivative from the first, is 
that between the reactive lawyer and the activist lawyer. The reactive 
lawyer acts as a mechanic, not redesigning any of the machinery, but 
only fixing the machines when they go awry. Reactive lawyers serve 
when rules are or might be broken within a relatively stable frame-
work of rules, and they also advise clients on how successfully to nego-
tiate within that framework. Even in a reactive legal system the rules 
may not be stable in the absolute sense, but at least they are relatively 
stable with respect to the role of the lawyer. Other actors in society 
may at times change the rules, but the reactive lawyer is involved at 
the pathological edge of the law, becoming involved only to the extent 
that rules are broken or rules are unclear with respect to a given 
course of conduct. 
The problem, to Ackerman, is that this role of the reactive lawyer 
does not fit with the role of law in modem American culture. Law in 
the United States now occupies a central place in the activist state, and 
the resultant activist law is profoundly dissimilar to reactive law. Ac-
tivist law, constantly changing, constitutes perhaps the most impor-
tant tool with which public officials forge a continuing series of new 
orders. In this system, therefore, unlike in the reactive system, the 
framework of rules is far from stable. The participants in the system, 
including and especially lawyers, do more than deal reactively with the 
occasional breakdown in a stable set of rules and practices. They are 
instead actively involved in a continuous process of changing the rules 
themselves. 
Activist law thus engages itself not only with whether the rules 
have been broken, but also and more importantly with whether even 
7. Although Ackerman takes the New Deal as the genesis of the activist state, one wonders 
whether activism in precisely Ackerman's sense hasn't always been a part of the American 
experience. 
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the unbroken rules should be changed. In this sense activist lawyering 
involves not merely operating within the rules, but constructing the 
rules'themselves, including quite often breaking down existing rules 
and reconstructing them to suit the needs of an activist culture. To 
Ackerman, therefore, the reconstruction of American law is the trans-
formation of the legal order from one that only stably reflects a stable 
society's normative presuppositions to one that actively participates in 
an unstable society's busy attempt to mold new forms of social 
organization. 
When law is reconstructed so that legal rules are treated, within 
the legal process, as written on tissue rather than in stone, then it 
should be apparent that the seam between law and the rest of life must 
shift. Factors previously thought irrelevant are now central parts of 
legal argument. As Ackerman importantly points out, this shift has a 
pervasive effect on something so apparently mundane as the "state-
ment of the facts." If the domain of "the facts" is itself determined by 
legal norms, and if those norms are in turn open for reconsideration in 
every legal argument, then there is no limit on those facts that might 
be relevant to a lawyer seeking to "rise to the Constructive occasion" 
(p. 3) and challenge the underlying presuppositions of the rule at issue. 
If "separate but equal" is the rule, 8 then the relevant facts are those 
that bear on the existence of identifiable equality between comparable 
and identifiable facilities.9 But if the separate but equal standard is 
itself open to question, then a much larger menu of social facts and 
sociological perspectives suddenly becomes relevant. 10 Similarly, if a 
purchaser is bound by all waivers of warranty as long as the classic 
conditions for contracting are met, then little factual information is 
legally relevant in a waiver of warranty situation except the document 
of waiver, evidence of the authenticity of the signature, and some evi-
dence of consideration. But if some waivers are void for unconsciona-
bility, 11 a new and vast realm of general commercial practices then 
becomes part of the good lawyer's presentation of the facts of the 
case.12 
The characteristic of contemporary American law that is Acker-
man's focus is thus profoundly anti-Realist. For although the Realists 
reacted to changes in the American legal landscape by urging greater 
particularity, Ackerman sees instead the need for much greater gener-
ality. Instead of looking at how this particular case is different from 
the rest of the world, we should be looking at how this case is part of 
8. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
9. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
10. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 & n.11 (1954). 
11. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
12. Ackerman uses the example of landlord-tenant relations to make this point. Pp. 73-74, 
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the rest of the world. Although Ackerman has major differences with 
the "law and economics" perspective (pp. 44-45, 64-65, 80-93), he also 
draws much of his inspiration from it (pp. 47-71). For that perspec-
tive is grounded on the assumption that particular transactions can be 
understood only in the context of a much less temporally bound story 
that begins with what caused the parties to find themselves in the posi-
tion that has now generated a legal event. That is, the economic anal-
ysis of law, to Ackerman, reminds us that we can understand the 
particulars only by broadening in both time and space our description 
of a particular event. The relevant facts are not only those as to who 
did what once they got to where they are now, but also those as to 
what put these parties rather than others in the position in which they 
now find themselves, and what put these parties in this position rather 
than some other. Ackerman's reliance on this broad perspective of 
law and economics is thus for him only an inspiration and an example, 
rather than a guiding principle for all legal inquiry. His guiding prin-
ciple, in one sense, is that the reconstruction of American law is a 
reconstruction of the field of vision with which we view legal events. 
As changing the rules becomes increasingly the task of the lawyer, the 
lawyer's field of vision must become increasingly enlarged, including 
but not limited to those economic facts that are relevant under an ac-
tivist but not under a reactive outlook. 
II 
Ackerman's central point is highly important and lucidly 
presented. 13 By suggesting that the aberrational and the systemic 
present two profoundly different ways of looking at the law, he has 
focused our attention on an illuminating feature of any system of rules 
- that following a rule, breaking a rule, and changing a rule are three 
quite different activities. Moreover, the distinction does not pertain 
only to rules in any strict sense. Much the same can be said about 
practices, procedures, habits, principles, and virtually any other way 
of organizing, normatively or descriptively, our experiences, our 
desires, and our existence. Although this distinction is not the only 
window through which the legal system can be viewed, it is clearly one 
that should not be ignored. For by drawing this distinction we can 
13. With reference to matters of style, however, I am troubled by Ackerman's occasional 
petulant dismissiveness with movements or perspectives with which he disagrees. This is most 
apparent with respect to the people in the Critical Legal Studies movement. See, e.g., pp. 43 
n.13, 44 n.15. Surely none ofus, including Ackerman, would want to be held to the standard to 
which he holds Duncan Kennedy - having "to confront, let alone resolve, the obvious inconsis-
tencies in the views expressed by his favored authors." Failing to do this is hardly, as Ackerman 
would have it, "name-dropping." All of us draw on some of the insights expressed by others 
without ever imagining that by so doing we are committed to the whole theory or position of 
which that one insight is a part. In addition, there are also snide references to certain members 
of the law and economics movement, references in a style that ought to have no part in a schol-
arly work. See, e.g., pp. 44, 65, 69, 90, 91. 
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begin to understand the role of the lawyer within the context of a 
larger universe of making and implementing social choices. 
Ackerman's distinction between the reactive and the active, and 
therefore the distinction between making rules and working within 
them, will not appeal to those who like their distinctions razor-sharp. 
Operating in a reactive mode still involves some influence on the stan-
dards themselves. For unless we are dealing with absolutely identical 
instances, the application of a rule, standard, or practice to any new 
situation involves some degree of modification of that rule, standard, 
or practice. This may at times be little more than clarification. And at 
times it may be more than that, making a decision about the scope of a 
rule or practice at the time, and not before, we are confronted with a 
new possibility of application. In this sense every application of a rule 
is also a case of rule making, and the distinction between changing 
rules, breaking rules, and following rules becomes cloudy. 
Similarly, any instance of activism involves some degree of opera-
tion within a relatively stable, or reactive, environment. Even jugglers 
stand on the ground while they are juggling, and so too a claim that 
activist lawyering involves a potential challenge to everything must be 
understood in a context in which "everything" does not mean "every-
thing." Reactivism and activism are both relative terms, and thus 
lawyering even in the activist mode will inevitably involve taking 
many things as settled while many other things, previously viewed as 
settled, are now up for grabs. 
Thus, even the reactive lawyer is involved in some degree of activ-
ism, and even the activist lawyer has a reactive side. Those who expect 
too much from their distinctions might very well take this as grounds 
for rejecting the importance of this distinction, and thus the impor-
tance of what Ackerman has to offer. But distinctions need not be 
taken as necessarily performing a sorting function. In many instances 
they can more usefully be viewed as suggesting contrasting emphases 
within a non-sortable whole. That certainly seems the case here. To 
think in terms of conformity or nonconformity with a rule or practice 
is different in emphasis from thinking about changing the rule or prac-
tice. A major part of the difference is that if the question is conformity 
vel non, then the rule or practice itself establishes much of the frame-
work for discussion. But if the rule or practice is open for adjustment, 
then it can no longer by itself be the framework. In such a case the 
framework becomes much more amorphous, much wider, and much 
more likely necessarily to include recourse not only to different disci-
plines, but also to a substantially less temporally and spatially bound 
array of social facts. By reminding us of this shift in scope that comes 
from this shift in task, Ackerman has performed an enormously valu-
able service for all who would think carefully about what it means to 
be a lawyer. 
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III 
Reconstructing American Law is above all a survival manual for 
lawyers. Indeed, Ackerman seems far from bashful about admitting 
that this is his mission here (pp. 106-10). Unlike some other repre-
sentatives of the Ackerman oeuvre, 14 this book is addressed not to so-
ciety at large, and not to those who would seek to create a better 
world, but rather to a profession seeking to survive in its own right in 
an extant world. 
Because I find Ackerman's map of the current legal landscape to 
be largely accurate, I also find myself in substantial agreement with 
Ackerman's advice to lawyers on what they must do to survive in this 
terrain. But although Ackerman sets for himself here a rather limited 
mission, I was prompted at least to think about the larger societal 
question lurking around every corner of this book. Indeed, although it 
is both wrong and too easy to criticize a book for not being what it 
does not purport to be, I did come away from it thinking of the old 
joke - "Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you enjoy the play?" 
The feeling lingers that something is missing. For the question that 
kept coming up in my mind was the larger one of whether society in 
general, or this society in particular, would or should want lawyers to 
survive in the role that Ackerman would have them play. Ackerman's 
survival manual envisages lawyers as special and central figures in the 
formulation of values and rules in a society in which the formulation 
and reformulation of those values and rules is a visibly recurrent part 
of the public agenda. But why lawyers? Who are we to deserve such a 
position of prominence at the helm of the ship of state? 
Ackerman is of course too perceptive not to have recognized that 
these problems are there to be confronted by society. Thus, he asks 
the reader to "[a]ssume, further, that the citizenry insists that law and 
lawyers have a central role ·to play in activist governance" (p. 28). 
And later he concedes that "[i]n a democratic activist state, it is up to 
the People, and not their lawyers, to decide upon the activist principles 
that will inform the legal system. If lawyers do not like the principles, 
P, that the People have chosen, they can try to persuade the People to 
change their mind. In the meantime, they have the democratic obliga-
tion to use P in a legal argument, rather than the not-P they favor in 
politics."15 
These caveats make it clear that Ackerman well knows that giving 
lawyers a central role in public policy and value formation is hardly 
without controversy. Confronting precisely that controversy is simply 
not Ackerman's agenda here, and that is an entirely appropriate 
choice for him to make. But one of the hallmarks of a good book is 
14. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). 
15. P. 79 (footnote omitted). 
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that it prompts the reader to think of things beyond the book's partic-
ular mission, and it is in this context that I was spurred by the book to 
think about whether writing a survival manual for lawyers, at least if 
survival depends on lawyers assuming the role that Ackerman would 
have them perform, is an enterprise deserving of praise or 
condemnation. 
Clearly a book review is the last place for me to offer my own 
extended views on what I think should be the role of the lawyer in 
American society, although it should be obvious that I remain uncon-
vinced that lawyers should be quite as central as Ackerman thinks 
they should be. For if indeed Ackerman's distinction between the re-
active and the activist can carry its weight, then it is not necessarily 
the case that the same people who serve primarily reactive tasks in 
society should also perform those functions that are primarily activist. 
The fact that rules, principles, and practices are constantly open to 
reconsideration in American society does not mean that there is no 
value in having rules, principles, and practices. And what distin-
guishes rules, principles, and practices from, say, responses, judg-
ments, and actions, is that rules, principles, and practices all involve 
some degree of regularity and stability. To choose new stabilities is not 
to destabilize. 
If this society is to have its stabilities in rules, in principles, and in 
practices, then there may still be a place for the enforcers of those 
stabilities. A society may, no matter how much of it remains open to 
change, still need those who will know what the unchanged rules are, 
and who can operate within the framework created by those un-
changed rules. As it is now, Ackerman is surely correct in noting that 
this function is performed by those, lawyers, who are also centrally 
involved in changing the rules. And he is also right in assuming that 
this trend is likely to continue, requiring that lawyers learn the many 
new tasks required of activist law-changers. But this is asking lawyers 
- or indeed any one class or profession - to take on a great deal. It 
may be that it is too much for lawyers to handle. It may be that soci-
ety would want the advantages that come from specialization. And if 
this is the case, then we might want to try to roll the clock back a bit. 
We might want to treat policy making and policy implementation as 
largely separate tasks. 
Should this society take that course and decide that lawyers are 
doing too much, it might for many be much less exciting to be a law-
yer. If activism in Ackerman's sense becomes primarily the task not 
of lawyers but of economists, managers, professional politicians, jour-
nalists, philosophers, or theologians, then the current allure of being a 
lawyer will, for many people, evaporate. It's nice to be where the ac-
tion is, and if the action is no longer with law and lawyers, then those 
who desire to be "active" might have to look elsewhere. This would 
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indeed be troublesome for the profession, but it might not be nearly as 
troublesome for American society. Bruce Ackerman is a lawyer, and 
so am I, so we can hardly be blamed for looking at society through 
lawyers' lenses. But not everyone in society shares this perspective. 
For the dialogue to continue, we need people who will look at this 
question as perceptively from a nonlawyer's perspective as Ackerman 
does from the lawyer's. 
